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The research aims to study the relationships between the current administrative policies and the performance 
of the Joint Service Council of Solid Waste Management in the middle and southern Areas of Gaza Strip. The 
research used the analytical descriptive methodology and used a questionnaire distributed to a sample 
consisting of (120) employees who are working in the Joint Service Council of Solid Waste Management in the 
middle and southern Areas of Gaza Strip (JSC-SWM). Using the Statistical Package for Social Studies program 
(SPSS), the results indicated that proper budgets, filling positions with local ordinance, pension and retirement 
system, fines and penalties for violating ordinance, and compensations are not used effectively in the JSC-
SWM as a tool to promote the performance of the council. The research recommended the activation of 
scientific tools for designing proper budgets, and unifying the administrative system which regulates the work 
of the council staff and in the same way of the municipalities’ ones. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
As the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) started its 
work in West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1993, it has worked 
under different rules of management that differs from the 
liberal-martial management. The role of oversight and 
administrative control bodies were absent at the 
beginning which was the most important stage to start 
control and facing any type of managerial corruption 
(Coalition for Accountability and Integrity, 2009). Another 
problem appears in the Palestinian public sector is the 
effect of the high commitment to the social traditions 
which implies that people have to help their relatives and 
friends and they cannot differentiate between helping 
close people and nepotism. As part of the Palestinian 
quest to improve the performance of municipal services, 
and in more specific; to develop the solid waste sector in 
Palestine, and as part of the National Strategy for Solid 
Waste Management; new bodies were established to 
combine the efforts of individual municipalities into what 
is known as the Joint Service Councils (JSC) (Jabr, 
2004). The first JSC concerned with solid waste 
management in the Palestinian Territory was established 
in Gaza Strip in 1995 covering the service area of the 
Middle and Khan Younis Governorates (13 
municipalities), followed in 2004 by the formation of 
second JSC to cover the North Governorate in Gaza Strip 
– the Solid Waste Management Council in North Gaza 
Governorate) (Safi and Luecke, 2007). Ever since, 
several JSCs were established in the West Bank 
benefiting from the experience in Gaza yet with greater 
geographic coverage constituting greater number of local 
government units (municipalities and village councils). 
The political and economic factors  play crucial role on 
service provision especially in the aftermath of the Israeli 
blockade on Gaza and the high unemployment and the 
subsequent low municipal revenues that contribute to 
financing the operations of both JSCs where most 
researchers and reports has focused on. The blockade 
on Gaza over the last decade has meant that municipal 
infrastructure was nearing collapse (MDLF, 2009). 
Nevertheless, effective and sustainable waste  
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Table 1: Policy versus Administration 
 
Policy Administration 
Enact a budget Propose a budget. Spend within budgetary limits. 
Define the powers, functions and duties of officers 
and employees 
Fill positions consistent with local ordinances. 
Fix the compensation of officers and employees. 
Administer payroll consistent with budget and 
compensation plan adopted by council. 
Establish the working conditions of officers and 
employees. 
Insure that proper working conditions are 
provided. 
Establish retirement and pension systems Administer pension and retirement plan. 
Adopt ordinances regulating local affairs. Implement and enforce ordinances. 
Set fines and penalties for violation of ordinances.  Collect fines and enforce penalties. 
Enter into contracts. 
Propose contracts. Manage approved contracts. 
Enforce contracts. 
Regulate the acquisition, sale, ownership, and 
other disposition of real property. 
Negotiate terms of acquisition and sale of real 
property; carry out acquisition and sale. 
Decide which government services will be 
provided. Adopt budgets for their provision. 
Oversee the day to day operation of programs and 
services provided by the local government. 
Establish Public Utilities. Manage provision of utility services. 
Grant franchise for the use of public ways. Enforce terms of franchise agreement. 
License, for the purpose of revenue and 
regulation, most any type of business. 
Administer business licenses as provided by 
council. 
Set tax rates and user fees consistent with state 
laws.  
Collect taxes and user fees. 
Approve claims against the city of county. 
Bring lawsuits, with legislative approval. Propose 
settlement of claims. Pay approved claims. 
Enter into agreements to accept grants and gifts. 
Propose agreements. Carry out terms of 
agreement. 
 
Source: (Municipal Research and Services Center of Washington, 1999, p. 18) 
 
 
 
management goes hand-in-hand with good public service 
and sound municipal management.  
 
 
Research problem 
 
The research studies the relationship between the current 
administrative policies and the performance of joint 
service council of solid waste management (JSC-SWM) 
in the middle and southern areas of Gaza Strip. Solid 
waste management strategies cannot be executed 
without the support and guidance of proper administrative 
framework. Administration should contain a series of 
ordinances and regulations aimed at managing solid 
waste, including procedures and methodologies for 
monitoring and enforcing the regulations. Consistent 
national policies on MSW administration are needed. The 
policies should encourage cross-jurisdictions and inter-
agency coordination, and facilitate implementation of 
economic instruments for improving the performance of 
the solid waste management councils, (Li, 2007, p. 11). 
According to Municipal Research and Services Center of 
Washington (1999), public bodies including the joint 
service councils of the solid waste management should 
adopt proper budgets, fill all positions with local 
ordinances, administer payroll consistently, pension and 
retirement plans, and collect fines and enforce penalties 
and other factors listed in the table 1.  
 
The research question: What is the relationship 
between the current administrative policies and the 
performance of joint service council of solid waste 
management in the middle and southern areas of Gaza 
Strip? 
 
 
Research Variables 
 
Dependent Variable: Performance of JSC-SWM 
 
Independent Variables: Administrative policies, 
Adopting proper budgets, Filling positions with local 
ordinances, Pensions and retirement system, Fines and 
penalties for violation of ordinances, Compensations, 
Personal characteristics among employees (sex, age, 
and education). 
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Hypothesis 
 
The research studied the following hypothesis: 
 
The Major Hypothesis: 
 
 There is a statistically significant relationship at 
a= 0.05 between the current policies and the 
performance of the JSC-SWM. 
 
This hypothesis is subdivided into the following 
hypotheses: 
 There is a statistically significant relationship at 
a= 0.05 between adopting proper budgets and 
the performance of the JSC-SWM. 
 There is a statistically significant relationship at 
a= 0.05 between filling positions with local 
ordinance and the performance of the JSC-SWM. 
 There is a statistically significant relationship at 
a= 0.05 between pension and retirement system 
and the performance of the JSC-SWM. 
 There is a statistically significant relationship at 
a= 0.05 between fines and penalties for violation 
of ordinance and the performance of the JSC-
SWM. 
 There is a statistically significant relationship at 
a= 0.05 between compensations and the 
performance of the JSC-SWM. 
 There is a statistically significant relationship at 
a= 0.05 in the responses due to the differences 
of personal characteristics among employees 
(experience, education, and profession).  
 
 
Research objectives 
 
The research aims to achieve multiple objectives 
identified as follow:  
 To identify the current administrative policies 
implemented by JSC-SWM in the middle and 
southern areas of Gaza Strip. 
 To identify the extent to which these 
administrative policies are effective at 
performance of employees. 
 To draw conclusions and recommendations 
about how to modify and reactivate these 
administrative policies. 
 
 
Importance of the research 
 
The importance of the research comes from the rareness 
of the studies about the administrative mechanisms, 
techniques, and tools used by the Palestinian public 
sector generally and JSC-SWM particularly to promote 
the public services to citizens. The research was 
conducted during a critical period of time as there are  
 
 
 
 
many calls for the reconditioning and reforming all the 
systems of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). On 
the other hand, the research could be used as a base to 
conduct an advanced future research of how to improve 
administrative policies to make them more effective and 
more suitable to the Palestinian context and public 
servants in JSC-SWM. 
 
 
Palestinian context of Solid Waste Management:  
 
Human activities produce volumes of unwanted materials 
known as solid wastes called “garbage” or "trash". Such 
unwanted material poses public health threat and 
unpleasant smells in addition to the damage to the 
aesthetics setting of a city, village, or the landscape of a 
country. Solid Waste also has other impacts on the entire 
environment with its air, ground water, and soil. In most 
countries, the local government or municipality or local 
government unit is responsible for managing solid waste, 
(Diaz et al., 2005).  Solid waste management (SWM) 
“encompasses the functions of collection, transfer, 
treatment, recycling, resource recovery and disposal of 
municipal solid waste. Its first goal is to protect the health 
of the population, particularly that of low- income groups. 
Other goals include promotion of environmental quality 
and sustainability, support of economic productivity and 
employment generation. Achievement of SWM goals 
requires sustainable SWM systems, which are adapted to 
and carried by the municipality and its local 
communities.” (Bushra, 2000, p. 8) 
In this research, the focus is made on municipal solid 
waste being the largest in volume in developing countries 
including Palestine. For simplicity, municipal solid waste 
(MSW) is produced primarily by ordinary activities in 
connection to households and similar activities like 
commercial activities and other public activities, (EEA, 
2013). The collection of solid waste is typically labor 
intensive where municipalities rely on labor to collect 
trash bags or empty waste bins into collection vehicles 
that range in type and size. SWM process does not end 
at the collection of “trash”, rather it continues into 
transferring such unwanted material to its final 
destination; the landfill, where it is buried and covered 
with earth material or as approved depending on the 
regulator’s requirements. In Gaza, the solid waste does 
not undergo resource recovery process where recyclable 
materials, such as plastics, metals, paper, and glass are 
filtered out to go back to factories that use them as input 
into new products.  
In the last 20 years, the European Union (EU) has 
presented a large body of waste legislation, including 
minimum requirements for managing certain waste types. 
“Three targets in particular should have led to a 
convergence of municipal waste recycling levels across 
Europe: the Landfill Directive's landfill diversion target for 
biodegradable municipal waste; the Packaging and  
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Table 2: Estimated Solid Waste Management Costs between 2010 and 2025 
 
Country Income Group 2010 Cost 2025 Cost 
Low Income Countries $1.5 Billion $7.7 Billion 
Lower Middle Income Countries $20.1 Billion $84.1 Billion 
Upper Middle Income Countries $24.5 Billion $63.5 Billion 
High Income Countries $159.3 Billion $220.2 Billion 
Total Global Cost (US$) $205.4 Billion $375 Billion 
 
Source: (Hoornweg and Bhada-Tata, 2012, p. 46) 
 
 
Packaging Waste Directive's recycling targets; and the 
Waste Framework Directive's recycling target for 
household and similar wastes”, (EEA, 2013). In Palestine 
as a case of developing countries, the issue of solid 
waste may not gain a priority status on national agendas, 
thus the entire process of solid waste management would 
seem far underdeveloped when compared to 
industrialized nations in Europe and North America. "In 
an attempt to accelerate the pace of its industrial 
development, an economically developing nation may fail 
to pay adequate attention to solid waste management. 
Such a failure incurs a severe penalty at a later time in 
the form of resources needlessly lost and a staggering 
adverse impact on the environment and on public health 
and safety", (Diaz et al., 2005). 
 
 
Financial aspects 
 
In terms of financing, low income countries generate less 
solid waste and spend less cost while the high income 
countries generate more solid waste and spend more 
cost. Table 2 shows the estimated solid waste 
management cost between 2010 and 2025. 
Palestinian Local Government Law of 1997 created the 
legal basis for establishing an institutional framework, 
such as a solid waste management council, that can 
manage a regional landfill facility and municipal waste 
collection on a district and regional scale. Article No. 15, 
Paragraph 8, stated that all local authorities are 
responsible for collecting SW from public places, 
transporting and disposing these wastes in designated 
areas. The same article stipulates that all local authorities 
shall take all precautions and procedures necessary to 
maintain public health and prevent outbreaks of 
epidemics among the people (Soufan, 2012). 
On the operational level, the World Bank (2012) 
estimated that the collection rate of the solid waste in the 
West Bank and Gaza is 85% in urban areas. The 
collection rate of solid waste puts Palestine in the ranks 
of middle and high income countries. the central 
government showed no spending at all while external 
donors provided 5.4 million US dollars and 11.6 million 
US dollars in 2011 and 2012 respectively (PCBS, 2012).  
The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) 
indicated in 2012 that the Palestinian government did not 
finance any infrastructure investment in the SWM sector 
in the West and Gaza, while foreign donors reserved 
almost 29% of their financing in the environment sector 
for SWM. The below figure illustrates that, and it can be 
concluded that investment in the solid waste 
management sector is entirely left for external donations. 
However, the same data showed the Palestinian 
government spending 27% of its finance in the 
environment sector in 2012, or 7,100,000 US dollars, for 
management, regulation, capacity building, and salaries 
which indicate the Palestinian government’s commitment 
to support operational aspects of SWM, i.e, salaries and 
running costs. It should be noted the local authorities 
collect fees for SWM services, but the collected fees are 
not enough to cover operational costs due to the 
economic conditions in Gaza and citizen’s inability to pay 
(MDLF, 2014). Figure 1 shows Palestinian governmental 
expenditure on environment in 2012.  
 
 
Institutional aspects 
 
Two government bodies are primarily responsible for 
SWM in Palestine; the Ministry of Local Government 
(MoLG), and the Environment Quality Authority (EQA). 
MoLG is the main coordinating agency for solid waste 
management within the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 
having overall responsibility for the relevant functions of 
local authorities and it supervises the establishment of 
the regional solid waste management. On the other hand, 
EQA is responsible for licensing of sites, environmental 
monitoring, provision of expertise and ensuring 
environmental protection. Other governmental agencies 
have roles but at different degrees concerning specific 
themes within the SWM sector. For instance, the Ministry 
of Health is concerned with the health care medical waste  
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Figure 1: Governmental Expenditure on Environment in Palestine 2012; left: Palestinian government’s expenditure, right: 
donors’ expenditure.  Data source: (PCBS, 2012) 
 
 
 
that consists of hazardous waste. The Ministry of 
Planning and International Cooperation is responsible for 
the overall planning and fund raising (El-Medhoun, 2015).   
Most of the day-to-day processing of solid waste 
(collection, transportation and disposal of waste, and 
operation and maintenance of facilities) is the 
responsibility of the local authorities. In larger towns and 
cities, this is usually the local municipality, while in 
smaller localities the village councils play a key role, often 
with coordination provided by the district authorities 
(UNEP, 2003). 
 
 
The Joint Service Councils (JSC) 
 
In 2004, MoLG established the General Directorate of 
Joint Services Councils for Planning and 
Development(GDJSC) within the ministry with a main 
purpose of setting forth the policies with regard to forming 
and supervising the Joint Service Councils for Planning 
and Development in the West Bank and Gaza (MoLG, 
2009). The objectives of the GDJSC are to:  
 Enhance the joint councils and prepare them for 
amalgamation, thus contributing to sustainable 
cooperation between local units. 
 Reinforce cooperation and integration among the 
joint councils within the framework of the 
Palestinian local government system. 
 Reinforce the capacities of the General 
Directorate of Joint Councils and enhance their 
role as a technical arm for the Ministry in the 
sector. 
 Support the joint councils to ensure their 
sustainability and enhance their capacities to 
help them perform their duties (El-Medhoun, 
2015). 
 
In 2006, the MoLG adopted the Statute of Joint Service 
Councils. The Statute defines rules of establishing JSCs, 
and elaborates their jurisdiction, membership, 
administrative structure, reporting, election and voting 
mechanisms. It also defines the “General Assembly” and 
“Board of Directors” of the JSC and sets out the roles and 
responsibilities of each. The key staff that must be 
retained by the JSC are also established in the Statute. 
The legal and financial status of a JSC established under 
the Statute derives from the legal status of its Local 
Government Unit (LGU) members. The MoLG has 
oversight responsibility for JSC’s (Daifi, 2012, p. 67).  
Table 2 provides the number and type of JSCs in the 
West Bank and Gaza. The multilateral JSC provides 
various services for a group of LGU’s, while the single 
JSC is concerned with one type of service for LGU’s, 
e.g., solid waste management or water. (MoLG, 2009).  
Table 3 shows the types of joint service councils in 
Palestine. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Bel and Warner, (2013) looked into the motivations for 
inter-municipal cooperation, where the researchers used 
fiscal constraints, economies of scale, community wealth, 
organizational factors (manager), and special factors as 
dependent variables and concluded that the theoretical 
expectations that fiscal constraints are significant factors 
for cooperation for small municipalities, but the case vary 
when larger samples were studied to find that 
“Technological improvements in service quality and the 
need to coordinate services across the metropolitan 
region are increasingly being referenced in the qualitative 
literature on cooperation as important drivers.” Thus the 
researcher suggested that other factors could be 
important in explaining cooperation. The importance of 
this paper that it pointed to the direction of other factors 
other than economic savings benefits of joint service 
provision; something that can benefit our research in  
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Table 3: Type of Joint Service Councils for Planning and Development (April 2008) 
 
Governorate Municipality Village 
Local 
Community 
Total 
JSC 
Single Multilateral 
1. Jenin 12 30 34 76 11 4 
2. Tubas 3 5 7 15 1 2 
3. Nablus 9 49 1 59 1 5 
4. Tulkerm 11 17 5 33 2 4 
5. Qalkilia 5 12 17 34 1 3 
6. Salfeet 9 10 - 19 1 3 
7. Ramallah 18 48 2 68 13 2 
8. Jerusalem 10 17 1 28 1 5 
9. Jericho 3 5 - 8 1 3 
10. Bethlehem 10 20 8 38 5 3 
11. Hebron 17 22 40 79 2 4 
12. Gaza 25 - - 25 6 3 
Total 132 235 115 482 45 41 
 
Source: Ministry of Local Government (MoLG, 2009) 
 
 
Gaza in modifying the conventional understanding of 
regional approaches (JSC) for sustainable service 
provision,.  
Al-Masri, (2012) aimed in his research at identifying the 
impact of role ambiguity on delegation of tasks and 
authority at the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG). He 
concluded that although the staff of MoLG are aware of 
the Ministry’s mission but less awareness was expressed 
by the respondents on more strategic issues and even on 
the detailed job description and specific roles of staff 
members. 
Bolgherini, (2011)  explored the relationships pertaining 
to government and governance at local level presenting 
two case studies from Italy and Germany. The researcher 
explained the purpose of this paper as an attempt “to 
show that the success of local territorial policies and 
reforms, such as the IMC (Inter-Municipal Cooperation) 
experiences, greatly depend on an efficacious balance 
between deliberative bodies, participatory modalities and 
“free choices” of the local actors, on the one side, and 
representative institutions, hierarchical decisions and 
centralistic guidelines, on the other side” (Bolgherini, 
2011, p. 5). The researcher concluded that direct 
comparison of two adjacent and pioneer countries in the 
area of municipal services and local governance is very 
important to learn from. This study can add to the value 
of this research in Gaza in terms of better exploration of 
the interrelations among municipalities and the central 
government. 
Abu Al-Aajeen, 2010 aimed in his research at 
identifying the impact of organizational obstacles on the 
performance of local authorities in Gaza Strip where he 
distributed a questionnaire to the local authorities 
(municipalities) in Gaza Strip. The researcher came with 
several recommendations, one of which is related to the 
human resource development (training and development) 
and the incentive system in Gaza municipalities, which 
the respondents indicated that both areas needed 
development and support by the local authorities.   
Saleh and Saad, (2010) did a study on four major Iraqi 
Governorates examining the level of services and 
correlated its ineffectiveness to the lack of administrative 
practices. The researchers recommended the 
establishment of Joint Service Councils citing number of 
its benefits and considering that approach as of “a 
modern local governance approach” (Saleh and Saad, 
2010, p. 183). The importance of this study that presents 
an example that is well behind the experience in 
Palestine. 
Shorab’s 2007 study aimed to identify the strength and 
weaknesses in the incentive system in the large 
municipalities of Gaza Strip and to explain the 
relationship between incentives and performance. The 
study used the analytical descriptive methodology with 
SPSS and used a questionnaire for the sample consisting 
of 55 employees who are working in supervision jobs. 
The study found that the employees are not satisfied with 
the incentives’ system, but they respond well to un-
financial incentives, although that their performance 
wasn’t up to the needed performance to achieve goals. It 
recommends municipalities should pay more attention to 
the financial reinforcements and connect it with the 
results of performance appraisal only. 
Al-Aksh, (2007) aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the reinforcement system in the Palestinian public sector; 
it also aimed to evaluate the role of these reinforcements 
on the performance of public employees. The study used 
the analytical descriptive methodology, SPSS and used a 
questionnaire for the sample which consisted of 346 
employees who are working in managerial and supervisor 
positions in the Palestinian ministries. The study found 
that the effect of incentives and rewards system on  
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Table 4: Correlation coefficient of each field in the questionnaire. 
 
Field Pearson Correlation Coefficient P-Value (Sig.) 
Adopting proper budgets 0.656 0.000* 
Filling Positions with local ordinance 0.814 0.000* 
Pensions and retirement system 0.643 0.000* 
Compensations 0.607 0.000* 
Fines and penalties for violation of ordinances 0.311 0.045* 
 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
 
improving the performance of the employees in PNA 
ministries is very weak, inactive and most of the 
employees don’t have any idea about the system. The 
study recommends that the incentives system should be 
checked and reevaluated, updated to fit the expectations 
of the employees in the public sector, and increased for 
the competent and active employees. 
Awad, (2005), aimed to evaluate the performance 
appraisal system which is being used in the PNA and 
how it affects the employee’s performance. The study 
used the analytical descriptive methodology with SPSS 
and used a questionnaire for the sample consisting of 
520 employees from the middle managers who are 
working in PNA institutions in Gaza strip. The study found 
that there is no relationship between employee’s 
performance appraisal and the reinforcements which 
he/she is going to receive and most of supervisors don’t 
know how to deal with unacceptable behaviors or how to 
implement punishment policies when it’s needed. It 
recommends that human resources departments have to 
give more attention to the performance appraisal process 
and top management should be committed to this 
process to make it effective, valid, and trusted. 
Kolab, (2004) aimed to evaluate the application of the 
internal monitoring system in the Palestinian public sector 
and to examine the relationship between the internal 
monitoring system and corruption and poor performance. 
The study used the analytical descriptive methodology 
with SPSS and used a questionnaire for the sample 
which consisted of 130 employees in 22 ministries. The 
study found that the weaknesses in the internal 
monitoring system are considered the most important 
reason for the administrative and financial corruption. It 
recommends that government should improve the 
coordination between the internal monitoring units in the 
different ministries, improve the used criteria of 
performance appraisal to make them able to measure the 
real level of performance, and activate the accounting 
system by legislating the needed laws which can define 
the procedures of how to deal with corruptors.   
Abo-Made, (2004) aimed to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the control methods in the Palestinian public sector 
and how these tools are being used to improve the 
performance of public employees. The study used the 
analytical descriptive methodology with SPSS and used 
two questionnaires for two different samples. The first 
one consisted of 380 mangers from the public sector 
institutions, and the other one consisted of 500 citizens in 
the Gaza Strip. The study found the Palestinian public 
institutions use budgets as a control tool, but this use is 
not effective so it affects the level of performance 
negatively. In addition, most of public sector’s mangers 
don’t use planning in performing their tasks, or in 
measuring performance. The study recommends 
government should start staffing according to the needed 
qualifications instead of the political belongingness.   
 
 
METHODOLOGY  
 
The population of the research consists of all the 
employees in JSC-SWM in the middle and southern 
areas of the Gaza Strip. The data collection depended on 
the survey method which included all the 120 employees 
in the JSC-SWM. The Data analysis was performed by 
using (SPSS 22) application. Various statistical methods 
were utilized including Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of 
normality, Cronbach's Alpha for Reliability Statistics, 
Pearson correlation for Validity, and others. 
 
Statistical Validity of the Questionnaire: To insure the 
validity of the questionnaire, two statistical tests of the 
validity and credibility were applied: 
 
Structure’s Validity: The researcher assessed the fields’ 
structure validity by calculating the correlation coefficients 
of each field of the questionnaire. Table 4 shows the 
Correlation coefficient of each field in the questionnaire. 
Table 4 clarifies the correlation coefficient for each filed 
and the whole questionnaire. The p-values (Sig.) are less 
than 0.05, so the correlation coefficients of all the fields 
are significant at α = 0.05, so it can be said that the fields 
are valid to measure what it was set for to achieve the 
main aim of the research.  
 
Reliability: Table 5 shows the values of Cronbach's 
Alpha for each filed of the questionnaire and the entire 
questionnaire. For the fields, the values of Cronbach's 
Alpha are in the range from 0.62 and 0.73. This range is 
considered high; the result ensures the reliability of each 
field of the questionnaire. Cronbach's Alpha equals 0.72 
for the entire questionnaire which indicates an excellent 
reliability of the entire questionnaire. Thereby, the 
questionnaire was valid and reliable. 
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Table 5: Cronbach's Alpha for each filed of the questionnaire and the entire questionnaire 
 
No. Field Cronbach's Alpha Consistency* 
1 Adopting proper budgets 0.62 0.78 
2 Filling Positions with local ordinance 0.66 0.81 
3 Pensions and retirement system 0.64 0.80 
4 Compensations 0.73 0.85 
5 Fines and penalties for violation of ordinances 0.67 0.82 
Total 0.72 0.85 
 
 
 
Table 6: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test of Normality. 
 
Variables 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Test Value P-value 
Adopting proper budgets 0.681 0.743 
Filling Positions with local ordinance 0.974 0.299 
Pensions and retirement system 0.699 0.713 
Compensations 0.962 0.287 
Fines and penalties for violation of ordinances 0.763 0.358 
ALL independent variables together 0.692 0.724 
 
 
 
Test of Normality: The One-Sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov Test procedure compares the observed 
cumulative distribution function for a variable with a 
specified theoretical distribution, which may be normal, 
uniform, Poisson, or exponential. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov Z is computed from the largest difference (in 
absolute value) between the observed and theoretical 
cumulative distribution functions. This goodness-of-fit test 
tests whether the observations could reasonably have 
come from the specified distribution. Many parametric 
tests require normally distributed variables. The one-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test can be used to test that 
a variable of interest is normally distributed.  
Table 6 shows the results for Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
of normality. From Table 3.6, the p-value for each 
variable is greater than 0.05, and then the distributions 
for these variables are normally distributed. 
Consequently, parametric tests will be used to perform 
the statistical data analysis. 
 
 
Data analysis 
 
Personal characteristics  
 
Personal characteristics contain sex, age, profession, 
qualifications in the JSC-SWM in the middle and southern 
areas of Gaza Strip. Table 7 shows personal 
characteristics of the sample. 
Hypotheses testing  
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a statistically significant 
relationship at a= 0.05 between adopting proper budgets 
and the performance of the JSC-SWM. Table 8 shows 
the means and test values for the first field. According to 
Table 8, the mean of the paragraph #8 equals 3.79 
(75.74%), test-value = 11.06, and P-value = 0.000, which 
is smaller than the level of significance.  The sign of the 
test is positive, so the mean of this paragraph is 
significantly greater than the hypothesized value 3. It can 
be conclude that the respondents agreed to this 
paragraph. 
According to the data in table 8, it can be concluded 
that there is a significant relationship between adopting 
proper budgets and the performance at level of (0.05), 
which means that financial reinforcements have a very 
important effect on employees’ performance. 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a statistically significant 
relationship at a= 0.05 between filling positions with local 
ordinance and the performance of the JSC-SWM. Table 9 
shows means and test values for the second field. Table 
9 shows that the mean of the paragraph#16 equals 3.54 
(70.81%), test-value = 8.40, and P-value = 0.000, which 
is smaller than the level of significance.  The sign of the 
test is positive, so the mean of this paragraph is 
significantly greater than the hypothesized value 3. It can  
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Table 7: Personal characteristics of the sample 
 
Personal characteristics Frequency Percent 
Gender 
Male 30 25 
Female 90 75 
Total 120 100.0 
Age 
20-30 50 41.6 
31-40 33 27.6 
41-50 17 14.2 
51-60 20 16.6 
Total 120 100.0 
Qualifications 
Ph.D. 1 .83 
Master 7 5.83 
Bachelor 45 37.5 
Diploma 53 44.16 
Others 14 11.6 
Total 120 100.0 
Job title 
Director 1 0.83 
Head of Department 5 4.16 
Head of Division 3 2.5 
Engineer 8 6.66 
Administrative 12 10 
Technician 21 17.5 
Laborer 41 34.16 
drivers 12 10 
Other 17 14.16 
Total 120 100.0 
 
 
 
Table 8: Means and Test values for the first field. 
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1 Employees participate in designing the annual budget. 2.54 50.72 5.92 0.000* 3 
2 
The administration designates financial reinforcements in 
the budget. 
1.92 38.37 13.63 0.000* 8 
3 
The financial reinforcements provided to employees are 
sufficient to do the job well. 
2.36 47.23 8.90 0.000* 4 
4 
The administration of JSC allows employees to review 
the budget. 
2.14 42.76 11.73 0.000* 6 
5 Administration publishes its annual budget to public 1.94 38.83 12.98 0.000* 7 
6 
Administration depends on financial experts to design the 
annual budget. 
2.18 43.53 11.31 0.000* 5 
7 
Administration adopts audit policy for its expenditures 
and revenues. 
3.16 63.13 1.63 0.051* 2 
8 
Administration shares employees in budgetary problems, 
solutions, and financial suggestions 
3.79 75.74 11.06 0.000* 1 
 
*The mean is significantly different from 3 
Wasim  059 
 
 
 
Table 9: Means and Test values for the second field. 
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9 The administration fills all the vacancies in the council. 2.65 52.96 4.20 0.000* 7 
10 
The administration publishes all the vacancies for one 
month before the process of screening  
2.73 54.65 3.59 0.000* 5 
11 
The publicity of vacancies matches with the legal policies 
and procedures of the Palestinian labor law. 
2.66 53.21 5.21 0.000* 6 
12 
All applications are screened based on equity and 
transparency. 
2.85 56.99 1.45 0.074 4 
13 All candidates require passing a relevant written test. 2.88 57.54 0.30 0.381 3 
14 All candidates require passing a competitive interview. 2.63 52.67 5.52 0.000* 8 
15 
All successful candidates are contracted according to the 
terms and rules of the Palestinian Civil Service Law. 
3.19 63.82 2.72 0.003* 2 
16 
All successful candidates receive a written copy of their 
job description before starting their work. 
3.54 70.81 8.40 0.000* 1 
 
* The mean is significantly different from 3 
 
 
 
Table 10: Means and Test values for the third field 
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17 
All employees are subjected to a unified law in terms of 
pension and retirement. 
2.94 58.88 0.18 0.429 4 
18 
Employees believe that their future plans of pension 
and retirement are less than their expectations. 
3.10 61.95 1.78 0.037* 3 
19 
Employees feel secure under the current policies of 
pension and retirement. 
3.39 67.78 5.56 0.000* 2 
20 
The administration of the council reviews the policies of 
pension and retirement with its staff. 
3.48 69.55 6.73 0.000* 1 
21 
The employees believe that their future plans of 
pension and retirement are essentials for their career 
development. 
2.78 55.59 4.32 0.000* 5 
22 
Employees think of resigning if they find another better 
employment opportunity. 
2.63 52.58 6.13 0.000* 6 
 
*The mean is significantly different from 3 
 
be concluded that the respondents agreed to this 
paragraph. 
According to the data in table 9, it can be concluded 
that there is a significant relationship between filling 
positions with local ordinance and the performance of the 
JSC-SWM at level of (0.05), which means that also filling 
positions with local ordinance have important effect on 
performance of JSC-SWM.  
 
Hypothesis 3: There is a statistically significant 
relationship at a= 0.05 between pension and retirement 
system and the performance of the JSC-SWM. Table 10 
shows the means and test values for the third field. 
According to the data in table 10, it can be concluded 
that there is a significant relationship between pension 
and retirement system and the performance of the JSC-
SWM at level of (0.05). 
 
Hypothesis 4: There is a statistically significant 
relationship at a= 0.05 between fines and penalties for 
violation of ordinance and the performance of the JSC-
SWM. Table 11 shows that means and test values for the 
fourth field. 
According to the data in table 11, it can be concluded 
that there is a significant relationship between fines and 
penalties for violation of ordinance and the performance 
of the JSC-SWM at level of (0.05).  
 
Hypothesis 5: There is a statistically significant 
relationship at a= 0.05 between compensations and the  
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Table 11: Means and Test values for the fourth field 
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24 
The council adopts a written-policy of the financial 
punishments provided by law to the new employee and 
partners. 
2.86 57.19 1.25 0.106 4 
25 
There is a lack of regulating the bylaws related to fines 
and penalties against the uncommitted partners. 
3.32 66.43 6.32 0.000* 1 
26 
The council punishes its partners for not paying its 
financial commitments to the council. 
2.96 59.16 0.31 0.378 3 
27 
There is a clear written policy of fines and penalties for 
violation of ordinance against the partners in case of 
violation. 
2.98 59.64 0.06 0.475 2 
28 
The council should design a clear cut policy explaining 
the adopted fines and penalties for violation of ordinance. 
2.78 55.60 3.79 0.000* 5 
29 
The council should reconsider the membership of the 
partners who delay the payments of their debts. 
2.49 49.79 6.59 0.000* 7 
30 
The council should design its relationship with partners 
based on their financial commitment toward the council. 
2.54 50.90 6.31 0.000* 6 
 
*The mean is significantly different from 3 
 
 
 
Table 12: Means and Test values for the fifth field 
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31 
The salary scale of the council has no unified legal 
basis.  
2.39 47.87 9.61 0.000* 4 
33 
The salary scale of the council is below what is 
stated in the Palestinian Civil Service Law. 
2.67 53.43 5.19 0.000* 2 
34 
The salary scale of the council is below the standard 
living in the society. 
2.63 52.50 6.29 0.000* 3 
35 
By time, employee’s enthusiasm to continue working 
for the interest of the council is weak. 
3.01 60.12 0.00 0.500 1 
 
*The mean is significantly different from 3 
 
 
performance of the JSC-SWM. Table 12 shows means 
and test values for the fifth field. 
According to the data in table 12, it can be concluded 
that there is a significant relationship between 
compensations and the performance of the JSC-SWM.at 
level of (0.05%). 
 
Hypothesis 6:  There is a statistically significant 
relationship at a= 0.05 in the responses due to the 
differences of personal characteristics among employees. 
This hypothesis can be split into the following sub-
hypotheses: 
 
 There is a statistically significant relationship 
at a= 0.05 in the responses among employees 
due to experience. Table 13 shows ANOVA test 
of the fields and their p-values for Experience. It 
can be concluded that there are no statistically 
significant differences among the respondents 
due to the experience. 
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Table 13: ANOVA test of the fields and their p-values for Experience 
 
Field 
Means 
Test 
Value 
Sig. Less than10  
years 
10-20 
years 
20 years 
and more 
Adopting proper budgets 5.73 6.35 7.35 4.008 0.235 
Filling positions with local ordinances 6.24 6.13 6.58 0.568 0.570 
Pensions and retirement system 7.08 6.78 7.77 2.095 0.133 
Fines and penalties for violation of ordinances 6.83 6.90 7.44 1.067 0.352 
Compensations 6.53 6.58 7.30 2.225 0.118 
 
*The mean difference is significant at 0.05 level 
 
 
 
Table 14: ANOVA test of the fields and their p-values for Education 
 
Field 
Means 
Test Value Sig. 
2 year 
diploma 
Bachelor’s 
Degree 
Master’s Degree 
and more 
Adopting proper budgets 6.80 5.97 6.89 2.467 0.095 
Filling positions with local ordinances 5.90 6.31 6.27 0.227 0.798 
Pensions and retirement system 7.93 6.78 7.25 1.691 0.194 
Fines and penalties for violation of 
ordinances 
7.43 6.75 7.23 1.393 0.258 
Compensations 6.75 6.71 7.30 1.589 0.247 
All Independent Variables Together 7.07 6.49 6.94 1.313 0.278 
 
*The mean difference is significant at 0.05 level 
 
 There is a statistically significant relationship 
at a= 0.05 in the responses among employees 
due to due to education. Table 14 shows 
ANOVA test of the fields and their p-values for 
Education. It can be concluded that there are no 
statistically significant differences among the 
respondents due to the experience. 
 There is a statistically significant relationship 
at a= 0.05 in the responses among employees 
due to due to position. Table 15 shows ANOVA 
test of the fields and their p-values for Position. It 
can be concluded that there are no statistically 
significant differences among the respondents 
due to the experience. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
In the light of the results of this research, it can be 
included the following:  
Without any doubt, the proper budgets of the JSC-
SWM has significant relation with the efficient and 
effective performance of the council and its services to 
citizens and this result matches with  the studies of Bell 
and Warner (2013) and Bolgherini (2011). 
Filling positions with local ordinances reinforces and 
supports the performances of the JSC-SWM and this is 
matching with the study of Saleh and Saad (2010) and 
Shorab, (2007).  
The financial reinforcements are strong fortifications for 
efficient and the effective performance of the JSC-SWM 
and the absence of different types of payments and fair 
retirement plan influences negatively the performance. 
This result matches with the study of Abo-Made (2004) 
and Awad, (2005). 
The financial punishments are strong tool on correcting 
the wrong practices and modifying the weak performance 
of the JSC-SWM. The result agrees with the study of 
Kolab (2004) and Abu Al-Ajeen (2010). 
 
062  E3 J. Bus. Manage. Econ. 
 
 
 
Table 15: ANOVA test of the fields and their p-values for Position 
 
Field 
Means 
Test 
Value 
Sig. Head of 
Dept. 
Head of 
Divisions 
Engineer Administrative Staff 
Technician 
Staff 
Adopting proper budgets 7.14 7.03 6.18 5.81 6.59 1.172 0.334 
Filling positions with local 
ordinances 
5.73 6.42 6.29 6.03 6.46 0.352 0.841 
Pensions and retirement 
system 
7.81 6.84 6.83 7.49 7.10 0.678 0.610 
Fines and penalties for 
violation of ordinances 
7.06 6.87 7.01 6.95 7.16 0.074 0.990 
Compensations 7.65 6.56 6.01 6.45 7.34 0.069 0.763 
All Independent 
Variables Together 
6.94 6.80 6.63 6.63 6.87 0.137 0.968 
 
*The mean difference is significant at 0.05 level 
 
 
Although the absence of fair compensations that match 
with the current Palestinian standard of living does not 
motivate employees to leave their work in the JSC-SWM, 
employees’ enthusiasm to work hard decreases by time 
Al-Aksh, (2007). 
The JSC-SWM does not have a policy which can 
regulate the issues of fines and penalties for violation of 
ordinances that might be committed by the member 
municipalities and this agrees with the study of Bolgherini 
(2011). 
The Palestinian Ministry of Local Governance doesn’t 
explain the offered types of reinforcements or 
punishments to the employees of the JSC-SWM, and the 
employees know that the different aspects of the 
Palestinian Civil Service Law and Palestinian Labor Law 
organize regulate their work. This is in contrast with the 
municipalities’ employees whose work is regulated only 
by the Palestinian Civil Service Law and this is matching 
the study of Awad (2005). 
The JSC-SWM doesn’t reinforce its employees enough 
whether financially or un-financially to do their own job 
well due to lack of funds and this is matching with the 
study of Shorab (2007). 
Reinforcements and punishments in the JSC-SWM are 
not introduced according to the yearly performance 
appraisal report and this is matching the study of Awad 
(2005).   
Personal characteristics of employees did not influence 
their answers regarding the necessity to have proper 
budgets, filling positions with local ordinances Pensions 
and retirement system, compensations, fines and 
penalties for violation of ordinances. 
 
 
Recommendations: 
 
In light of the aforementioned results, the following points 
are recommended: 
 The JSC-SWM has to revise its offered 
reinforcement policy for its employees to keep its 
services up to the planned level. 
 The JSC-SWM has to start imposing punishment 
policy in the needed cases, and develop methods 
and techniques of punishments for the member 
municipalities for not paying their financial 
entitlements. 
 The Palestinian Ministry of Local Governance 
has to deal with the staff of the JSC-SWM equally 
and fairly and in the same way of the 
municipalities’ staff who are subjected to the 
Palestinian Civil Service Law.  
 The JSC-SWM should start adopting scientific 
tools, and with financial experts or consultants, 
for designing proper budgets that can promote 
the performance of the council. 
 The JSC-SWM should offer reinforcements 
according to the performance appraisal reports, 
to maintain fairness and justice. 
 The JSC-SWM should reinforce employee’s 
attitudes against wrong practices by providing 
employees with suitable training courses.   
 The JSC-SWM has to improve its response to 
employees’ performance during the year, and not 
only at the end of the year. 
 
 
Suggested Further Studies 
 
According to author’s knowledge, this is the first study to 
be conducted on the factors that might influence the 
performance of The JSC-SWM in Gaza Strip. This field of 
research is completely new and deserves more 
exploration in the Palestinian society. Therefore, the 
following future studies are suggested: 
 
 
 
 
 
 The validity and reliability of the performance 
appraisal system adopted by the joint service 
councils and the Palestinian Ministry of Local 
Governance. 
 The validity and reliability of budget system 
adopted by the Palestinian Ministry of Local 
Governance. 
 Corruption channels in the Palestinian Ministry of 
Joint Service Council and in the PNA institutions 
in general. 
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